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NOTES.
THE LIABILITY OF A VENDOR TO ONE WITI1 "WHOM HE HAS
No CONTRACTUAL RELATION.

The books, in dealing with this problem, state the rules
somewhat dogmatically. First, they say that he who supplies
an article for resale which is imminently dangerous to life
or health, becomes liable in tort to the person injured by its
use. Under this classification fall the drug cases in which
noxious drugs are sold under harmless labels,1 or the quantity
of the dose is injurious and the manufacturer or the original
vendor is the only one who knows its ingredients. 2 On the
'George v. Skivinglon, L R. 5 Ex. i (1869); Thoynas v. Winchester,
6 N. Y. 397 (1852).
Blood Balm Co. v. Cooper, 83 Ga. 457 (1889).
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other hand, a manufacturer who supplies a machine or appliance without knowledge of any defect is usually not held in
tort by a stranger to the contract 3 If, however, such machine or appliance is placed upon the market with knowledge
on the part of the manufacturer of a latent defect which he
conceals, or about which he remains reticent when it is his
duty to speak, he becomes liable.'
To state the rules as given adds to clearness, only until it
is attempted to apply them to a new situation.
The question under consideration came before the Supreme
Court of the United States recently in the case of WatersPicrce Oil Co. v. Desclius3 B, the oil company, sold to a
retail dealer X, as coal oil, a mixture from a tank containing
six thousand six hundred gallons of coal oil, into which by
mistake three hundred gallons of gasoline had run. There
was evidence to show that while B knew of the defect, it was
not thought that sufficient gasoline had flowed into the coal
oil tank to materially affect the quality of the latter. X resold
to A, who used the fluid to kindle a fire. The mixture proved
highly inflammable and an explosion resulted whereby A's
wife and children were killed and his house destroyed. There
was also proof that B knew of the custom in that locality of
kindling fires by the aid of kerosene. In an action by A
against B he was allowed to recover, aside from the question
of contract, on the ground that B owed a duty to see that the
oil supplied by him was not dangerous to the life or limb of
the user.
Neither of the rules stated cover this case. Coal oil, unlike
a drug, is not imminently dangerous to life or health, so as
to invoke the application of the first rule. It yet awaits a
decision declaring it inherently harmful. Petroleum lubricating oil has been held not to he imminently dangerous, and
proof of negligence in its manufacture and knowledge of any
defect has been required in order to impose liability. Nor
will the second rule cover this case, for there must be knowledge of the defect to make a manufacturer of an article liablef
It will be observed that while the manufacturer knew there
had been a slight mixture, he thought, bona fide, that there
'Bragdon v. Perkins-Campbell Co., 87 Fed. iog (i89S); Lewis v.
Terry, iii Cal. 45 (1896).
'Schubert v. Clark, is L. 1L A. (N. S.) 8x8 (Minn.) (1892).
5- Supreme Ct. Rep. 270 (1909).
'Standard Oil Co. v. Murry, iig Fed. 572 (xgo2).
'Hci-er v. Kingshand Co., iio Nev. 6o5 (z892).
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was no defect which made the oil highly inflammable. Assuming, however, that this would be sufficient knowledge, the
language of the Court 8 goes further when it is said that they
do not wish to be confined to the facts before them and to be
understood as moulding their conclusions therefrom, but that
"under the general principles of law sustained by the authorities already cited, a recovery against the oil company might
be justified."
A better statement of the rule should therefore be deduced
from the cases, with which, perhaps, the principal case may
be consonant.
It would seem that wherever a vendor or manufacturer
places upon the market an article which can only be used in
a certain way, and if used for that particular purpose or in
that peculiar manner, injury results, he should be liable.' This
is true whether he actually knew.of the defect or not. Furthermore, even if he inform the intermediate man, he will not
escape liability.10 If, however, the article is sold not for resale,
but for the use of the vendee, and he informs the vendee of
the defect, or, if ignorant of the defect, upon inspection it is
accepted by the purchaser, the seller should not be answerable
to a third party."1
A contractor who supplies an appliance to be used by another's servants becomes liable if when that machine is used
in the only way it was intended, it proves unfit, to the injury
of the servants. 12 And this should be true even though the
master has been informed of the defect and gives no notice
to his servants."'
There is mentioned in the principal case the knowledge by
the defendant of the peculiar use, viz.: kindling fires, to
which the coal oil was put in the community. If the case
were decided solely on the ground that one is bound to see
that an illuminating oil is not an improper mixture when put
to an inordinate use, we should indeed have a startling proposition. True, when there is knowledge on the part of the original vendor that the article is to be used by certain persons,
such as infants, but in the manner in which it was intended,
'P. 26.
"Clement v. Crosby & Co., iii N. NV. (Mich.) 745 (igo7).
"Stowell v. Standard Oil Co., 139 Mich. I8 (1-o5); Clement v.
Crosby & Co., iir N. W. (Mich.) 745 (x9o7).
" Curtlin v. Somerset, 140 Pa. 70 (x891).
"Heaven v. Pender, L. L ii Queen's Bench Div. 5o3 (1883) ; Cook v.
FloatingDry Dock Co., r IHilt (N. Y.) 436.
" Lechman v. Hooper, 52 N. J. L. 253 (189o).
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a false representation will entitle him who uses it to his injury
to recover from the original seller.'" The question of knowledge of its use, however, when the oil is used in a manner
which everyone knows is dangerous even when pure, brings
little order out of chaos. The question is simply, is the article
fit for the particular purpose for which it is paraded on the
market.1 5
We shall not dilate upon the problems of proximate cause,
which is prolix in its ramifications. The question is briefly
whether the interjection of a human agency, the intermediate,
seller, is a break in the chain of concentration which will relieve the original vendor. There is a line of cases represented
8
which say that where there is the interby Fowles v. Briggs,"
vention of a human agency upon whom rests the obligation
of inspection, the chain is broken. - Those cases do not arise
from a situation where there are a series of events resulting
from the placing of an article on the market for resale. When
an article or machine is sent out to be passed on by resale,
or when it is furnished under contract to be used by another's
servants, an injury, resulting from the only use for which it
was intended, would seem to be the result of a chain of
events so natural as to form one whole and to be the natural
and probable consequence of the defendant's act."T
The principal case, while not so clear as one might desire
on the question of knowledge of the defect in the article sold,
at least in the dictum of the courts, places the law where it
ought to be and removes much of the confusion which has
resulted in making arbitrary distinctions between articles as
to which are and which are not inherently dangerous.1 '

UNDUE PREFERENCE UNDER THE ENGLISH RAILWAY ACTS.

In Hohwell Iron Co. v. Midland Ry.,' the plaintiff claimed
that the defendant company had granted undue preference to
three rival companies, each in different localities. As to the
first, the defendant (lid all the terminal service and provided
" Levy v. Langridge, 4 Ai. & W. 337 (1838).
" Watson v. Augusta Brewing Co., I L R. A. 1178 (Ga. i9o5).
ir16 Mich. 425 (1898).
"IHavcrly v. State Line R. Co., 135 Pa. So.
" Huset v. Case Threshing Machine Co., i2o Fed. 865 (19o3).
' L R.I K. B. (i909) 486.
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all terminal accommodations free of charge and granted lower
rates for siding and main line work. This they justified as
part consideration for the conveyance of certain private railways and sidings. As to the second, the defendant allowed
certain rebates for hauling their traffic over their intervening
sidings to and from the defendant's railway. These traders
had better facilities with rival railways and secured the rebates
because of competition. Such rebates were not in excess of
reasonable remuneration for the services performed. As to
the third, rebates were allowed in respect of services performed by them at their private sidings.
The Court held that such agreements, as in the first case,
must be viewed with great suspicion, but it cannot be held
as a matter of law that the payment for railway services or
accommodation must take the form of coin of the realm.
Since this agreement of purchase explains and accounts for the
inequality of rates and is a fair and honest bargain, and since
the consideration has been duly conveyed to and is enjoyed by
the railway company, it is impossible to say that it is also
an undue preference.
Where the reduced rate is due to competition and is not a
pure and simple gift,2 but a reasonable remuneration.3 for the
services performed in hauling his traffic over his intervening
private sidings to and from the railway, it is justified. As to
the third, recovery was barred by the statute 4 which limits the
bringing of action to one year after knowledge of the undue
preference.
The English law, as relating to carriers, differs in several
important respects from the American acts. The Act of 1854 '
enacts that no such company shall make or give any undue
or unreasonable preference or advantage to or in favor of
any particular person, company or traffic, or subject the same
to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage whatsoever.
Under the statute it is held the act complained of must be
undue, unreasonable, or unfair in the company's treatment of
the parties under investigation relatively to one another. A
mere inequality in charge raises a presumption 6 that it is undue, unreasonable, or unfair, but it may be rebutted by a
'Phipps v. L. & N. W., 8 Ry. & Ca. Tr. Cas. 83 (1892) 2 Q. B.
'IHickelton v. Dock Co., 12 Ry. & Ca. Tr. Cas. 63 (19o3).
'Act 888 (5x and 52 Vict. C.25), seC. 12.
9 17 and 18 Vict. c. 31, sec. 2.

'Denaby v. Manchester,3 Ry. & Ca. Tr. Cas.'426, 441 (88o).
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bona fide effort to regulate I the traffic, a reasonable compensation 8 for services rendered, an increased length of haul,9 or
a reasonable 10 relation to the economy effected, as in the increase or decrease of the average cost of working. While the
mere existence of competition is not any justification 11 for a
difference in rates or rebates, it cannot be said as a matter
of law 2 to be a consideration which may not be considered by
the Commission or the courts, but it is one of the facts
entering into the reasonableness of the rate.
Under the English Act of 1888,13 the carrier must first submit its agreements or changes of rates to the Commission.
Under the Act of 1873 1' this Commission was composed of
three persons, one experienced in the law and another in railway business. By the Act of 1889 15 a Judge of the High
Court was appointed to preside at the sittings of the Commission, which was then declared a Court of Record, not liable to
be restrained by prohibition, injunction, certiorari or otherwise. The Commission is authorized 10 to take into consideration the interests of the public, but shall not sanction or allow
any difference in the tolls, rates or charges made for, or any
difference in the treatment of, home and foreign merchandise,
in respect of the same or similar services.
The Equality Clause of 1845 1? required equality of rates for
transportation "over the same portion of the line of railway
under the same circumstances." While the McCullom Act "
was modeled upon the prior English acts, the phraseology was
so changed, the economic conditions are so different and the
methods of railway management are so dissimilar to those in
England that the English cases may be used only with great
caution. However, the reasoning of the English cases has been

' Oxkade v. N. E. R. (864), i Ry. & Ca. Tr. Cas. 167'M. S. & L. R. v. Denaby, 4 Ry. & Ca. Tr. Cas. 438 (1884).
'Merry v. G. S. & IV. R. (1884), 4 Ry. & Ca. Tr. Cas. 383.
" Belsdyke Co. v. N. B. R. (1875), 2 Ry. & Ca. Tr. Cas. xo5.
'Liverpool Assn. v. L & N. W. R. (189o), 7 Ry. & Ca. Tr. Cas. 126.
"Phipps v. L. & N. IW., supra.
"Supra.
it 36 and 37 Vict. c. 48.
52 and 53 Vict. c. 57.
"Act 1888 (5r and 52 Vict. C.25), sec. 27, p. 2.
'Act 1845 (8 Vict. c. 2o), sec. go.
"24 Stat. at L 379; 34 Stat. at L 584; 35 Stat. at L 6D.
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adopted by our Federal Courts' and the same results have
been reached in the decisions where the economic conditions
are similar.
Thus it has been held by a number of State courts that concessions may 20 be made to secure competitive business, even
if discrimination is involved, though the better and prevalent 21
rule is contra. Cartage may be accesorial service furnished
free to some and denied to others.21 Competition may lawfully be considered where it is not the only element of difference between the shippers. 23 So, as in the principal case, a
rebate may lawfully be allowed as consideration for a contract,2' or as remuneration for services s or a difference in
the method of shipment.2 0 Some doubt is cast upon the ability
of the carrier to purchase property in consideration of prospective freight rates 27 and the payment for transportation in
anything other than currency.

CONTRACTS "IMPOSSIBLE OF PERFORMANCE.

The facts that make an agreement impossible of performance
may have existed (i) at the time the contract was made, or (2)
they may have arisen subsequent to the formation of the contract, but before its performance.
An example of the first class arises where a certain cargo
of goods, supposed to be at sea, is bought, and at the time of
"'Interstate Coin. v. Louisville R. R., 73 Fed. 409 (1896); Tes. &
Pac. R. R. v. Interestate C., 162 U. S. 197, 222 (1896); Interstate Corn.
v. B. & 0. R. R., 145 U. S. 263 (t892).
'Johnson v. R. R., 16 Fla. 623; 26 Amer. Rep. 731 (r878); Lough v.
Outerbridge, 143 N. Y. 27z; 42 Amer. St. Rep. 712 (1894).
= Wight v. U. S., 167 U. S. 512 (1897); Messenger v. P. R. R., 36
N. J. L 407; 37 N. J. L. 531 (1874).
" L C. C. v. Detroit R. R., 167 U. S. 633 (1897); 4 Elliot on Railroads, sec. 1678.
"L C. C. v. Ala. Midland, 163 U. S. 144 C897); Louisville R. R. v.
Beldmer, 175 U. S. 648 (Igoo); East. Ten. R. R. v. L C. C., t8r U. S.
1 (19or).
"Root v. Long Island R. R., 4 L. R. A. .33 (x889).
Chicago & Alton R. R. v. U. S., 156 Fed. 558 (19o7).
Penn. Ref. Co. v. R. R., Wo8 U. S. 2o8 (igo8).
,Weleetka Co. v. Fort Smith R. R., 12 1. C. C. Rep. 503 (19o7). See
Drinker's The Interstate Commerce Act, chap. x to xix.
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the sale of the cargo is not in existence.' Or where an agreement is based on the existence of a certain judgment which
does not exist.2
The general rule in such cases is that the contract is void on
the ground of mistake, both parties having contracted on the
assumption of the existence of the subject matter. So if the
purchase price had been paid, it could be recovered.
An example of the second class arises where there is a contract to sell specified goods, and before completion of the contract the goods are destroyed without the fault of either party.'
Or where an act of the Legislature passed subsequent to the
agreement prevents performance.' Or where a contract for
personal service is made and the promissor dies before performance.'
It is to cases of this class that the rules relating to impossibility apply.
In cases of this class the parties might have made either of
two kinds of contracts. (i) That the promisor would absolutely assume the obligation. (2) That the parties intended
the performance of the contract to depend, respectively, on
the law remaining unchanged, and the subject-matter, or the
promisor himself, continuing in existence.
If the first, then impossibility, clearly, would be no defense.
If the second, it should be. Which kind of agreement was
in fact entered into, is a question of construction.
In early times the agreement was construed very strictly
against the promisor "because he might have provided against
it by his contract."'
The modern tendency seems to be towards a more lenient
construction. More regard is paid to what must have been
the intention of the parties. Thus, in the recent case of the
Martin Einerich Outfitting Co. v. Siegel, Cooper Co.,1 the
defendant, who operated a department store, agreed to allow
the plaintiff to occupy the third floor to conduct his furniture
department for the mutual benefit of both parties, the agreement to continue for five years. After the commencement of
'Couturier v. Hastie, 5 H. of L. C. 673 (1856).
*Gibson v. Pelkie, 37 Mich. 380 (1877).
.
' Dexter v. Norton, 47 N. Y. 62 (x87I).
'Baily v. De Crespigny, L. R. 4 Q. B. i8o (1869).
'Marvel v. Phillips, 162 Mass. 399 (I89); Dickinson v. Calahan, 19
Pa. 227 (1852).

Paradinev. Jane, Alen, 26.
N. E. i1o4 (Illinois).
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this period, the building was accidentally destroyed by fire. It
was held that the agreement did not constitute a lease, but as
it concerned the occupation of a certain space, the destruction
of that space discharged the defendant from any further obligation.
Taylor v. Caldu'ells seems to be the first case that departed
from the strict rule.' In this case it was held that the destruction of a music ball between the (late of a contract for its hire
and the date fixed for its use, discharged the contract. The
Court said that where from the nature of the contract it
appears that the parties must from the beginning have known
that it could not be fulfilled unless some specified thing continued to exist, so that they must have contemplated such continuing existence as the foundation of what was to be done,
the contract is to be construed as subject to an implied condition, that the parties shall be excused if performance is prevented by the destruction of the thing without the fault of
either party.
The Court here, then, apparently read in an unexpressed
condition in order to carry out the intention of the pamities.
This view has been adopted in this country. Thus, where
the performance of a contract was prevented by the action of
the state, it was held that "this result was within the contemplation of the parties, and must be deemed an unexpressed
condition of their agreement." 10 And in another case: "We
think that as both parties had in view the contingency, * * *
it was an implied part of their contract." 11
Under this view on the performance becoming impossible,
the contract should be regarded as rescinded ab fidtio. So if
in a contract for the sale of goods, the purchase money has
been paid and the goods are subsequently destroyed, but before
the title has passed to the purchaser, the purchase money can
be recovered.22 Or if work has been -done under a contract,'
but complete performance is prevented, the value of the work
can be recovered. 1
In England a different view is taken. Performance is excused, not because of any unexpressed condition which the
83 B. & S. 824 (x863).
'Paradine v. Jane was recognized as the law in England in Hall v.

Wright, E, B. & E. 746, 789, 791 (1859).
"People v. Insurance Co., 9i N. Y. i7.
IDolan v. Rogers, 149 N. Y. 492 (1896).

"Kelly v. Bliss, 54 Wise. 287 (i882).
'!Dolan v. Rogers, ir4N. Y. 49&
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parties had in mind, but because the event which renders the
performance impossible was not in the minds of the parties
when the contract was made, and therefore is not within the
contract."
So if the event rendering performance impossible is one
which probably was in the contemplation of the parties, as contrary winds in a charter party, then impossibility is no excuse,
for the parties must have intended to include it in the contract, and the Court will not read in a condition that is not
there26
The consequence resulting from this view is well illustrated
by a series of cases that arose out of contracts made in view
of the ceremonies contemplated at the time of the coronation
of 1902, and frustrated by the King's illness. It was held, that
a contract to hire a room to see a procession was discharged
on the procession not taking place.1 6 Both parties were relieved from any obligation. The price agreed upon could not
be recovered, nor could the other party demand the use of the
rooms for that day. But where money was actually paid over
for a seat in a grandstand, the money could not be recovered
on the procession being called off. 17 The contract is not rescinded ab initio, but .the further performance merely excused.
And, therefore, if the money was due before the procession
was called off, but not paid, it can be recovered.,
There are, then, two views; first, that the defense of impossibility is based on a condition implied in fact, and, the
condition failing, the contract is rendered void ab initio and
the money can be recovered. Second, that the event which
happened was not within the contract, so performance is excused on either side, but anything done under the contract is
valid.
It is submitted that the second view is the better, since it
conforms more nearly with the actual facts.

U

"It is on this principle that the act of God is in some cases said

to excuse the breach of a contract." Baily v. De Crespigny, L P. 4 Q.

B. at p. 185. Pollock defines an act of God as, "An event which, as

between the parties and for the purpose of the matter in hand, cannot
be definitely foreseen or controlled." Walds PoL on Contracts, page 535
(3rd ed.)
' See Blakely v. Muller, 1903, 2 K. B. 76D, per Wills, 3.
"Krell v. Henry, 1903, 2 K. B. 74(X
" Blakely v. Muller, 1903,2 K. B. 76o; Clark v. Lindsay, 88 L T. ip9.

" Chandlerv. Webster, i94, z K. B. 493.
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PossEssioN

ALONE AS

SUFFICIENT TO UPLIFT THE STATUTE

OF FRAUDS.

The explanation of the doctrine of part performance that
prevails to-day is that expressed by Lord Westbury-not in
connection with the doctrine of part performance, howeverto the effect that the Statute of Frauds shall not be used as
an instrument of fraud.' One line of decisions has followed
this strictly and wherever there was fraud, irreparable in damages, has uplifted the statute.2 Another line has held that
coupled with fraud the act done as part performance must point
to a contract of some sort before the statute is raised, s thus
putting the jurisdiction not merely on the ground of fraud,
but of evidence. While this added requirement may make
the exercise of the jurisdiction more certain to work justice
and less likely to allow that against which the statute was
aimed, nevertheless the statute required a certain kind of evidence in order to charge the defendant, to wit: a writing, and
anything other than that would seem to be clearly insufficient.
Consequently, part performance, which is merely evidentiary
of a contract, but which does not cause a fraud to arise, would
seem to be not enough to uplift the statute.
The question arises as to what constitutes sufficient part perfonnance to take a case without the statute, which would
otherwise be within it. In a recent case under an oral promise by B that if A, his son, would support B and B's wife
(luring their lives, A should have the property B lived on, W
went into possession with B and supported B and his wife
(luring B's life. On a bill being filed for specific performance,
it was held that the possession which "was as exclusive as
the terms of the contract and the circumstances admitted"
and the fact that he had performed the services, together constituted sufficient part performance to take the case without
the statute. Taylor, et al., v. Taylor, 99 Pac. Rep. 814
(Kansas).
For some time mere possession by the vendee has been
looked upon as sufficient part performance. In an early case
it was said that inasmuch as possession was delivered according to the agreement, he [Lord Chancellor Jefferies] took the
bargain to be executed,' but no further explanation was given.
It is suggested that an equitable title was regarded as vested
in the vendee by the possession and with this the first sections
'.McCorntick v. Grogan, L. R. 4 E. & I. A. C. 82, 97 (I869).
'Slingerland v. Slingerland, 39 Minn. I97 (1888).
'Maddison v. Alderson, L R. 8 A. C 467 (x883).
'Butcher v. Stapely, x Vern. 363 (1685).
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of the statute had nothing to do, they concerning only the
creation and assigmient of legal estates. But by the vesting
of the equitable :itle a trust arose which is in terms excepted
from the statute by the eighth section. Opposed to this view
is that of Gibson, J., in an early Pennsylvania case, that an
equitable title was ve..tcd in the vendee by the mere contract to
sell without the delivery of possession, and that such an equitable estate came within the terms of the first three sections
and prevented specific performance unless in writing.'
Under the fraud theory it has been held that mere possession
is sufficient, because unless the contract could be shown by the
vendee in possession. he would be a trespasser and this would
be a fraud upon him. The contract being admitted for this
purpose should be admissible throughout.6 At least one jurisdiction has made mere possession sufficient by statute. The
contrary conclusion is reached in several jurisdictions, the
reason being that while it is not contravening the statute to
allow the contract to be offered in evidence as a defense
against trespass, yet it would be in the very teeth of the statute
to allow a defendant to be charged on a contract, even under
the circumstance of the vendee in possession. There being no
fraud, therefore, since the one in possession has an adequate
defense to a trespass, there is no need of uplifting the statute.$
Those jurisdictions holding that possession is sufficient require the possession to be exclusive,' and it is generally held
that the possession of a son with his father is insufficient, the
reason being, of course, that the possession is explicable
in many other ways than on the hypothesis of any contract
existing between the parties.10 The conclusion of the principal
case that the possession was as exclusive as possible would
seem to go farther than generally held. The mistake, it is
submitted, is in starting with the thought that possession takes

the case without the statute, whereas the rule is that to take
the case without the statute there must be circumstances
working a fraud and evidence pointing to a contract, and only
where the possession is such as to satisfy these requirements
is it sufficient."
'Wilson v. Clark, i W. & S. 554 (Pa. 1841).
'Clnan v. Cooke, z S. & L 22 (8o2); Ungley v. Ungley, L R. s Ch.
D. 887 (1877) ; Andrews v. Babcock, 63 Conn. jo9 (1893).
'Iowa State Code of 1897, secs. 4625-6.
'Ann Lodge v. Leverton, 42 Texas, 18 (1875); Glass v. Hulbert, 102
Mass. 24. 32 (mft).

'Baldwin v. Baldwin, 73 Kans. 39 (tgo6).
' Crank v. Trumble, 66 Ill. 428 (1872) ; Johns v. Johnm, 67 Ind. 440
(1879).
" But see McKay v. Calder-wood, 37 Wash. 194 (i90$).

